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Abstract: This paper compares two voting methods commonly used in
presidential elections: simple plurality voting and plurality runoﬀ. In a situ-
ation in which a group of voters have common interests but do not agree on
which candidate to support due to private information, information aggrega-
tion requires them to split their support between their favorite candidates.
However, if a group of voters split their support between their favorite can-
didates, they increase the probability that the winner of the election is not
one of them. In a model with three candidates, due to this tension between
information aggregation and the need for coordination, plurality runoﬀ leads
to higher expected utility for the majority than simple plurality voting if the
information held by voters about the candidates is not very accurate.
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Consider a group of voters who must decide between three candidates, say, A,
B, and C, for a single public oﬃce. Some of the voters clearly prefer candidate
C to the other two. The rest of the voters, presumably the majority, must
decide whether to support candidate A or B. Under certain circumstances, it
would be better for the majority to elect A, while under other circumstances
it would be better to elect B. Voters do not know with certainty which of
the two cases holds. There is, however, some information dispersed among
voters. An election might be an opportunity to aggregate the information
about the desirability of electing A or B. The ability to aggregate information
rests on the possibility of majority voters splitting their support between A
and B, according to the private information they may have. Nevertheless, if
voters in the majority split their support between two candidates, they run
the risk of losing the election to the candidate supported by the minority.
Thus, there is a potential conﬂict between information aggregation and voter
coordination. This paper explores this conﬂict within the context of a game-
theoretic model where voters behave as rational, strategic agents. Attention
is restricted to the two common voting methods used in presidential elections:
simple plurality voting and plurality runoﬀ.
The model shows that there are at least three equilibria under simple
plurality. In one of them, majority voters vote according to their private
information, and in the other two, majority voters coordinate in support-
ing only A or only B. If the expected voting share of candidate C is low
enough, the ﬁrst equilibrium is likely to lead to successful information ag-
gregation in the sense that the most desirable alternative for the majority is
elected. However, if the expected voting share of candidate C is high enough,
successful information aggregation is possible only if the information held by
majority voters about the candidates is very accurate. Otherwise, it is better
for majority voters to disregard their private information and to coordinate
in supporting only A or only B.
Under plurality runoﬀ, on the other hand, there is (under certain condi-
tions) only one equilibrium,1 in which voters vote according to their private
1To avoid dealing with abstention, the analysis of plurality runoﬀ focuses on the case
in which candidate C is high enough, a condition which will be elaborated on further in
1information. In this equilibrium, information is successfully aggregated in
the sense that the most desirable alternative for the majority either wins an
outright victory in the ﬁrst round or makes it into the runoﬀ election.
This model can help illuminate some common concerns about the eﬀects
of plurality runoﬀ in presidential regimes, particularly in Latin America,
where ﬁve out of 18 countries employ plurality voting and twelve employ
plurality runoﬀ in presidential elections (Nohlen 1997). Opinion in Latin
America turned towards plurality runoﬀ in part as a result of the victory
of Allende in a disputed three-way race in Chile and the subsequent demise
of democracy by the military intervention of 1973.2 More recently, plurality
runoﬀ has been criticized as leading to a proliferation of candidates, due to
low costs of entry, which may lead in the long run to a lack of consolidation
of a bipartisan system (Shugart and Carey 1992). In the model proposed,
equilibrium under plurality runoﬀ does lead potentially to a larger number of
serious candidates than plurality voting. However, the model casts a positive
light on this apparent weakness of plurality runoﬀ as it is a condition for
successful information aggregation in a single election.
Moreover, in some episodes such as Fujimori’s victory in Peru’s 1990 pres-
idential election, the runoﬀ voting method has been charged with leading to
seemingly erratic behavior by voters.3 The evolution of voters’ intentions
before the ﬁrst round of Peru’s 2000 presidential elections was again con-
sider erratic by the media. This time Fujimori was running for reelection,
and opinion polls showed swift variations in the support for the diﬀerent op-
position candidates.4 Our model suggests that voters may appear “ﬁckle”
before the ﬁrst round of a plurality runoﬀ election precisely because equi-
librium behavior requires them to react to all sources of information about
the paper.
2Chile’s 1925 constitution provided for the Chamber of Deputies to decide between the
two candidates with the most votes, assuming neither one had the majority. However,
until the military coup, presidential elections operated de facto under plurality voting,
since whenever the chamber was required to decide, it picked the candidate with the most
votes.
3Schmidt (1996) emphasizes the importance of electoral rules to explain Fujimori’s
victory over Vargas Llosa. Vargas Llosa (1993) contains a very readable account of that
election.
4See e.g. “Cholo Challenge,” The Economist, March 25, 2000. Eventually, Fujimori
won a runoﬀ election amidst widespread allegations of fraud.
2the desirability of the alternatives with less regard for possible coordination
problems than under simple plurality. The apparent ﬁckleness of voters may
be a rational reaction to poor information about the candidates. 5
It has been noted that plurality runoﬀ has the potential for leading to the
election of a president with little congressional support. This might be the
case if a completely diﬀerent method such as proportional representation with
large electoral districts were used to elect the congress. The model proposed
here does not take into account the possible incompatibility between the
methods used for electing the president and those used for the congress (an
issue dealt with by Shugart and Carey in their 1992 analysis of electoral
institutions and also by Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). This important
topic is left for future research. Also, the analysis of a lower threshold than
50% for victory in the ﬁrst round is left for future work.
On a more technical note, the analysis of large voting games within a
framework of rational strategic voters carried out here is complicated because
it requires voters to compare the probabilities of the diﬀerent situations in
which a vote may be decisive, even if all these probabilities are nearly zero
for a large electorate. The task has been made relatively easier by the intro-
duction of Poisson games by Myerson (1997, 1998a, 1998b), which allow to
compute the ratios between limit probabilities of diﬀerent events with large
electorates. The analysis in this paper is carried out within a framework of
Poisson games. Other applications of this framework include Feddersen and
Pesendorfer’s (1999) analysis of abstention in two-way races and Myerson’s
(1998c) analysis of scoring rules (a class of voting rules that excludes runoﬀ)
in three-way races with complete information.
2 Basics
A group of voters must choose one out of three alternatives. Alternatives
are denoted by X ∈ {A,B,C}. There are three types of voters, denoted by
t ∈ {t1,t2,t3}. Each voter’s preferences over the alternatives depend on the
voter type and the state of the world, ω ∈ {ω1,ω2}. Denote by U(X,t,ω) the
5A formal analysis of opinion polls would require to introduce another stage in the game,
before the elections, and is beyond the scope of this paper. Some early and interesting
references are Simon (1954) and McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985).
3utility payoﬀ for a type t voter if the state is ω and alternative X is chosen.
It is assumed that for every alternative X, U(X,t1,ω) = U(X,t2,ω), and for
t = t1,t2,
U(C,t,ω1) = U(C,t,ω2) = U(B,t,ω1)
< U(A,t,ω1) = U(A,t,ω2) < U(B,t,ω2).
That is, voters of types t1 and t2 have common preferences, they would like
alternative A to be chosen in state ω1 and alternative B to be chosen in state
ω2, and they are at best indiﬀerent between alternative C and any other
alternative. It might be useful to think of alternative B as an “entrant”
about which there is imperfect information disseminated among majority








to be the relative gain for t1 and t2 voters of choosing alternative B instead
of A or C in state ω2 . Note that uAB,uCB > 0.
It is also assumed that for ω = ω1,ω2,
U(A,t3,ω) = U(B,t3,ω) < U(C,t3,ω).
That is, voters of type t3 would like alternative C to be chosen, regardless
of the state of the world, and they are indiﬀerent between the other two
alternatives.
Prior beliefs about the state of the world are denoted by q(ω), with
q(ω1) + q(ω2) = 1. The number of voters is a random variable that has a





Each voter type is drawn from a distribution function that depends on the
state of the world. Denoting by r(t|ω) the probability that a random voter
is of type t given state ω, it is assumed that
r(t1|ω1) = r(t2|ω2) = r11 > 0,
r(t1|ω2) = r(t2|ω1) = r12 > 0,
r(t3|ω1) = r(t3|ω2) = r3 > 0,
4with
r11 + r12 + r3 = 1 and r11 > r12.
That is, a voter is more likely to be of type t1 than of type t2 if the state is
ω1, and the opposite if the state is ω2. It is also assumed that r3 < 1/2, so
that voters of type t3 are likely to be a minority with respect to the combined
population of types t1 and t2. Given a state ω, the random number of type
t voters has a conditional probability distribution that is Poisson with mean
nr(t|ω), as discussed by Myerson (1997). The fraction
r11
r11 + r12
represents how accurate is the information held by majority voters about
candidates A and B.









, q(ω2|t2) = 1 − q(ω1|t2).
Note that r11 > r12 implies
q(ω1|t1)/q(ω2|t1) > q(ω1|t2)/q(ω2|t2).
In what follows, two diﬀerent voting methods are considered in this setup:
simple plurality voting and plurality runoﬀ. These methods presents voters
with diﬀerent games, so that equilibrium predictions are potentially diﬀerent.
Since it has been assumed that the combined population of t1 and t2 voters are
likely to be a majority (arbitrarily likely, for large n), a reasonable criterion to
judge a voting method is to look at the expected utility of t1 and t2 voters in
equilibrium. Note that the expected utility of t1 and t2 voters in equilibrium
is bounded from above by U(A,t1,ω1)q(ω1)+U(B,t1,ω2)q(ω2). It will be of
particular interest to determine under which conditions this upper bound is
attainable under each voting method.
53 Plurality Voting
Under plurality voting, each voter must cast simultaneously a vote for either
A, B or C, and the alternative that receives most votes is chosen. Ties are
broken alphabetically. This choice of a tie breaking rule is made only for
expositional convenience and other tie breaking rules such as a fair coin toss
will lead to the same results.6
A strategy function is a mapping σ : {t1,t2,t3} → ∆({A,B,C}), where
σ(X|t) is the probability that a voter will vote for alternative X if his type
is t. Note that σ(X|t) ≥ 0 for every X and every t, and
P
X σ(X|t) = 1 for
every t. Each voter’s behavior as predicted by the strategy function depends
only on his type because, as discussed by Myerson (1997), two voters of
the same type have no commonly known attributes by which others can
distinguish them. A strategy function σ is an equilibrium under plurality
rule if it maximizes the expected utility of every given voter when other
voters use the strategy σ.
For a given strategy function, the probability that a random voter votes





Given a strategy function, the number of voters who choose X if the state is
ω is a Poisson random variable with mean τ(X|ω)n, for X = A,B,C. From
the discussion in Myerson (1997a), these are independent random variables.
Moreover, from the viewpoint of any given voter, the number of other voters
who vote for X in state ω is described by the same random variable that the
total number of voters who vote for X. Thus, the probability that k,l,m
other voters vote for A,B and C, respectively, is just
P(k;τ(A|ω)n)P(l;τ(B|ω)n)P(m;τ(C|ω)n).
This probability will be denoted P σ(k,l,m|ω).
6A similar choice is made by Palfrey (1989) and Fey (1997), for identical reasons. A
random tie-breaking rule would increase the number of events to be considered in Lemma
2 below. The events disregarded, however, correspond to near three-way ties, so their
probability converges very fast to zero.
6Note that, for a t1 or t2 voter, voting for C is a strictly dominated strategy
if there is some positive probability that voting for C actually leads to C being
chosen, while voting for A leads to A being chosen. But this probability is
positive independently of the strategy chosen by other voters because the
event that the total number of voters is one has no zero probability. For a t3
voter, voting for C is a strictly dominant strategy for the same reason. Thus:
Lemma 1 Given any strategy σ followed by every other voter, if a voter is
playing a best response then he will vote for C with probability 0 if his type
is t1 or t2 and with probability 1 if his type is t3. Thus, if σ is an equilibrium
strategy, σ(C|t1) = σ(C|t2) = 0 and σ(C|t3) = 1. 2
It remains to determine conditions under which t1 and t2 voters will sup-
port alternative A or B. In deciding how to vote, a strategic voter takes into
account exclusively the events in which his vote is pivotal – i.e., it actually
makes a diﬀerence with respect to the outcome of the election. Those events
are in this model {voting for A yields A but voting for B yields B}, {voting
for A yields A but voting for B yields C}, and {voting for A yields C but
voting for B yields B}. The probabilities of these events depend on the state





























σ(m,k + 1,k + 2|ω).
These three probabilities involve near two-way ties, and converge to zero
as the expected number of voters n goes to inﬁnity. To determine the best
response of a t1 or t2 voter in a large election, it is useful to know how fast















−(τ(X|ω)1/2 − τ(Y |ω)1/2)2 if T(ω) ≥ τ(Z|ω)




1/2 − τ(Y |ω)
1/2)
2 ≥ −1 + 3T(ω)
with strict equality if and only if T(ω) = τ(Z|ω) > 0. The proof of the
lemma is in the appendix and is an application of the “magnitude theorem”
in Myerson (1998b). The lemma states that the probability of a near tie
between two alternatives goes faster to zero if the probability that a random
voter votes for the excluded alternative is higher than the geometric mean
of the probabilities of voting for each of the three alternatives. Otherwise,
the probability of a near tie between two alternatives goes faster to zero the
larger is the diﬀerence between the probabilities that a random voter will



















and similarly for the other pairs of probabilities. This fact will be used
throughout the paper.














8Gσ(t) is the expected (normalized) gain of voting for A instead of for B for
a t1 or t2 voter, conditional on the information possessed by the voter. Since
q(ω1|t1)/q(ω2|t1) > q(ω1|t2)/q(ω2|t2), this gain is strictly larger for a t1 voter
than for a t2 voter. Thus
Lemma 3 Given a strategy σ followed by every other voter, if a voter is
playing a best response and his type is t1 or t2, he will vote for B with
probability 0 if Gσ(t) > 0 and with probability 1 if Gσ(t) < 0. Moreover,
Gσ(t1) > Gσ(t2). If σ is an equilibrium strategy, then
σ(B|t2) < 1 ⇒ σ(B|t1) = 0 and σ(B|t1) > 0 ⇒ σ(B|t2) = 1.
2
This lemma simpliﬁes the search for equilibrium strategies. In particular,
deﬁne
h = σ(B|t2) + σ(B|t1).
By an abuse of notation, denote by h any strategy σ that satisﬁes the re-
strictions imposed by Lemmas 1 and 3, and such that σ(B|t2)+σ(B|t1) = h.
Note that h = 0 denotes an equilibrium in which all t1 and t2 voters vote for
alternative A, h = 2 denotes an equilibrium in which all t1 and t2 voters vote
for alternative B, and h = 1 denotes an equilibrium in which t2 voters vote
for B and t1 voters vote for A.
We have:
Theorem 1 For large enough n, there is an equilibrium with h = 0, an equi-
librium with h = 2, and at least one equilibrium with 0 < h < 2. The value
of h corresponding to a sequence of these intermediate equilibria converges to
1 as n goes to inﬁnity. 2
Proof To prove that there is an equilibrium with h = 0 and an equilibrium
with h = 2, we can use Lemma 2 and p0
AC(ω1) = p0













Thus, for large enough n, G0(t1),G0(t2) > 0 and G2(t1),G2(t2) < 0.
9Note that, from Lemma 3, 0 < h < 1 is an equilibrium iﬀ Gh(t2) = 0;
1 < h < 2 is an equilibrium iﬀ Gh(t1) = 0; and h = 1 is an equilibrium iﬀ
G1(t2) ≤ 0 and G1(t1) ≥ 0. The proof that there is an equilibrium with an
intermediate value of h consists of three cases. Let
R = (r11r12r3)
1/3 .



















































































= q(ω1|t) − uABq(ω2|t).
Note that
q(ω1|t2) − uABq(ω2|t2) < q(ω1|t1) − uABq(ω2|t1).
We have ﬁve subcases. Suppose ﬁrst that q(ω1|t1) − uABq(ω2|t1) < 0.
Then limn→∞ G1(t1),G1(t2) < 0. Consider a strategy h = 1 + , with  > 0
and such that r12(1−) > r3 and r11(1−) > r12+r11. These two conditions
10imply that τ(A|ω1) > τ(B|ω1) > τ(C|ω1) and τ(B|ω2) > τ(A|ω2) > τ(C|ω2).
Note also that
−((r11(1 − ))
1/2 − (r12 + r11)
1/2)
2 > −((r11 + r12)
1/2 − (r12(1 − ))
1/2)
2
















Thus, limn→∞ G1+(t1) > 0. Since Gh(t1) is continuous in h, this implies that
for large enough n there exists some µ(n) ∈ (0,) such that G1+µ(n)(t1) = 0.
But then h = 1 + µ(n) is an equilibrium. Since  can be chosen to be
arbitrarily small, for large n we can ﬁnd an equilibrium arbitrarily close from
above to h = 1.
Suppose that q(ω1|t2)−uABq(ω2|t2) > 0. Then limn→∞ G1(t1),G1(t2) > 0.









Thus, limn→∞ G1−(t2) < 0. Since Gh(t2) is continuous in h, this implies that
for large enough n there exists some µ(n) ∈ (0,) such that G1−µ(n)(t2) = 0.
But then h = 1 − µ(n) is an equilibrium. Since  can be chosen to be
arbitrarily small, for large n we can ﬁnd an equilibrium arbitrarily close from
below to h = 1.
Suppose that q(ω1|t2)−uABq(ω2|t2) < 0 < q(ω1|t1)−uABq(ω2|t1). In this
subcase, for large enough n, h = 1 is an equilibrium.
Suppose that q(ω1|t1) − uABq(ω2|t1) = 0 and limn→∞ G1(t1) = 0. For
any subsequence such that G1(t1) converges from above, we are back in the
previous subcase, while for any subsequence such that G1(t1) converges from
below we are in situation similar to the ﬁrst subcase considered. The analysis
is similar in the last subcase, q(ω1|t2) − uABq(ω2|t2) = 0.












































































































= q(ω1|t) − uCBq(ω2|t).
The rest of the analysis is similar to the previous case. In particular, if










If q(ω1|t1) − uCBq(ω2|t1) < 0, limn→∞ G1(t1) < 0 and limn→∞ G1+(t1) > 0.
Thus, for large enough n there is an equilibrium arbitrarily close from above
to h = 1, while if q(ω1|t2)−uCBq(ω2|t2) > 0 there is an equilibrium arbitrarily
close from below. If r11 ≤ r3, the position of the intermediate equilibrium
with respect to h = 1 in those subcases is reversed.


















































= 2q(ω1|t) − (1 + uCB)q(ω2|t).
The rest of the analysis is similar to previous cases. In particular, if
2q(ω1|t1) − (1 + uCB)q(ω2|t1) < 0, there is an equilibrium arbitrarily close
from above to h = 1, while if 2q(ω1|t) − (1 + uCB)q(ω2|t) > 0, there is an
equilibrium arbitrarily close from below. ￿
The equilibria with h = 0 and h = 2 are sometimes referred as “Du-
vergerian equilibria” in the political science literature (see, e.g., Riker 1986,
Cox 1997 and the references therein). In the Duvergerian equilibria of the
model, only two of the three alternatives receive a positive fraction of the
votes cast in the election. The idea is that, if a voter perceives that no one
else will vote for a given alternative, voting for that alternative would be
equivalent to “wasting a vote” because the probability that this alternative
will be nearly tied for the ﬁrst place is negligible compared to the probability
that the other two alternatives will be nearly tied. The next result estab-
lishes that, if r11 ≤ r3, a non-Duvergerian equilibrium would entail a utility
loss for t1 and t2 voters. Since t1 and t2 voters are in the majority, we may
think about a non-Duvergerian equilibrium as a sort of coordination failure.
For the case r11 > r3, however, a Duvergerian equilibrium would constitute
a coordination failure:
Corollary 1 If r11 ≤ r3, the maximal equilibrium expected payoﬀ for t1 and
t2 voters converges to max{U(A,t1,ω1),q(ω1)U(B,t1,ω1)+q(ω2)U(B,t1,ω2)}
as n goes to inﬁnity. If r11 > r3, the maximal equilibrium expected payoﬀ for
13t1 and t2 voters converges to q(ω1)U(A,t1,ω1) + q(ω2)U(B,t1,ω2) as n goes
to inﬁnity. 2
Proof For the ﬁrst part, note that an equilibrium with h = 0 has expected
payoﬀ of U(A,t1,ω1), while an equilibrium with h = 2 has an expected payoﬀ
of q(ω1)U(B,t1,ω1)+q(ω2)U(B,t1,ω2) for t1 and t2 voters. From Theorem 1,
both equilibria exist. An equilibrium with 0 < h < 2 can improve upon both
h = 0 and h = 2 only if in this equilibrium τ(A|ω1) ≥ r3 and τ(B|ω2) ≥ r3.
Thus we need
σ(A|t1)r11 + σ(A|t2)r12 ≥ r3,
σ(B|t1)r12 + σ(B|t2)r11 ≥ r3.
Since r11 > r12, we have (2−h)r11 > r3 and hr11 > r3. Adding up these two
inequalities we obtain r11 > r3.
For the second part, from Theorem 1, there is a sequence of equilibria with
0 < h < 2 such that h converges to 1. But if r11 > r3 and h is close enough to
1, alternative A will win the election with probability arbitrarily close to 1 in
state ω1, while alternative B will win the election with probability arbitrarily
close to 1 in state ω2. ￿
4 Plurality Runoﬀ
Under plurality runoﬀ, each voter must cast simultaneously a vote for either
A, B or C, and the alternative that receives most votes is chosen if the
number of votes it receives exceeds half the total number of votes cast in the
election. Otherwise, the two alternatives that receive more votes go into a
runoﬀ election, and the alternative with most votes in the runoﬀ is chosen.
Ties are broken alphabetically.
With respect to the runoﬀ, suppose the electorate is drawn again accord-
ing to the process described in section 2. For a large n, this means that the
probability of A or B defeating C in a runoﬀ is arbitrarily close to 1. Also,
from Theorem 2 in Myerson (1998a), there is a sequence of equilibria in the
continuation game corresponding to a runoﬀ between A and B such that
the probability of A being chosen in state ω1 and the probability of B being
14chosen in state ω2 converge to 1 as n goes to inﬁnity.7 We do not model ex-
plicitly the continuation game corresponding to a runoﬀ and instead assume
that A or B defeat C with probability 1 in a runoﬀ, and that A defeats B
with probability 1 if and only if the state is ω1.
A strategy function ˜ σ in a plurality runoﬀ game is a mapping ˜ σ :
{t1,t2,t3} → ∆({A,B,C}), where ˜ σ(X|t) is the probability that a voter
will vote in the ﬁrst round for alternative X if his type is t. We must have
˜ σ(X|t) ≥ 0 for every X and every t, and
P
X ˜ σ(X|t) = 1 for every t. A
strategy function ˜ σ is an equilibrium if it maximizes the expected utility of
every voter when other voters use the strategy ˜ σ.
As before, let τ(X|ω) be the probability that a random voter votes in the
ﬁrst round for alternative X in state ω for a given strategy ˜ σ. The number of
voters who choose alternative X if the state is ω is, then, a Poisson random
variable with mean τ(X|ω)n. We will denote by ˜ P ˜ σ(k,l,m|ω) the probability
that k,l,m voters vote for alternatives A, B and C respectively in the ﬁrst
round, in state ω given the strategy ˜ σ.
Note that a vote for C in the ﬁrst round increases the probability of C
being chosen in the ﬁrst round or disputing a runoﬀ, while leaving unaﬀected
the outcome of a runoﬀ, if every voter uses runoﬀ pooling strategies. On the
other hand, voting for A or B reduces the probability of C being chosen in
the ﬁrst round or disputing a runoﬀ, while leaving unaﬀected the expected
outcome in case of a runoﬀ. Thus, voting for C is a strictly dominant strategy
for t3 voters. However, as opposed to the case of plurality rule, voting for
C is not a strictly dominated strategy for t1 and t2 voters. The reason is
that we do not allow for abstention, and for some strategy proﬁles t1 or t2
voter may prefer to avoid being decisive for a victory of A or B in the ﬁrst
round, if the risk of C winning in the ﬁrst round or getting into the runoﬀ is
small enough.8 To keep matters simple, rather than allowing for abstention,
we restrict our attention to situations in which C is a “serious contender.”
7The same result is shown by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) in a game without
population uncertainty: if the size and preferences of the electorate are common knowl-
edge, elections fully aggregate information in a two-way race in the sense that the chosen
alternative would not change if all private information would be common knowledge.
8See Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) and (1999) for an analysis of two-way races in
which voters may be better oﬀ abstaining.
15Formally, C is a serious contender if









and r3 > 1/3. This condition requires that r3 is closer to 1/2 the closer is r12
to r11. The intuition for this requirement is that a voter will be less tempted
to abstain to vote for either A or B the larger is the risk of C winning the
election and the better is the information contained in the voter’s type. The
following result is proved in the Appendix:
Lemma 4 If a voter is playing a best response, then in the ﬁrst round he
will vote for C with probability 1 if his type is t3. Moreover, if C is a seri-
ous contender and the strategy followed by other voters satisﬁes ˜ σ(C|t1) =
˜ σ(C|t2) = 0 and ˜ σ(C|t3) = 1, for large enough n if a voter is playing a best
response then in the ﬁrst round he will vote for C with probability 0 if his
type is t1 or t2. 2
A t1 or t2 voter deciding whether to support A or B must be concerned
about the events in which his vote is pivotal. Those events are: {voting for
A in the ﬁrst round ultimately yields A but voting for B yields B}, {voting
for A in the ﬁrst round ultimately yields A but voting for B yields C}, and
{voting for A in the ﬁrst round ultimately yields C but voting for B yields
B}. The probabilities of the last two events are 0, regardless of the state of
the world. This is because a near tie between C and any other alternative in
the ﬁrst round already implies that a runoﬀ will take place once one more vote
is cast for either A or B, and C will ultimately be defeated. The probability


























˜ σ(k,k + m,m|ω) + ˜ P
˜ σ(k,k + m + 1,m|ω)

.
The ﬁrst term represents situations in which a vote for either A or B deter-
mines which of the two alternatives disputes a runoﬀ with C. The second
16term represent situations in which a vote for A leads to a runoﬀ between A
and B while a vote for B leads to a victory of B in the ﬁrst round. Similarly,
the probability of the ﬁrst event given state ω2, if other voters are following

























˜ σ(k + m,k,m|ω) + ˜ P
˜ σ(k + m + 1,k,m|ω)

.
The two probabilities just described converge to 0 as the expected number
of voters n goes to inﬁnity. The following lemma tells us how fast they
converge. Let


















The proof of Lemma 5 is in the appendix. Lemma 5 reﬂects the fact that
the more likely event in which a vote for A or B is decisive is either a near
tie between A and B for the second place in the ﬁrst round or a situation
in which alternative B in state ω1 (or alternative A in state ω2) is close to
winning the election in the ﬁrst round (and avoiding losing the runoﬀ).
Let
˜ G





˜ G˜ σ(t) is the expected (normalized) gain of voting for A instead of for B for
a t1 or t2 voter, conditional on the information possessed by the voter. As
in the case of plurality, this gain is larger for a t1 voter than for a t2 voter.
Thus
17Lemma 6 Given a strategy ˜ σ followed by every other voter, if a voter is
playing a best response and his type is t1 or t2, he will vote for B in the
ﬁrst round with probability 0 if ˜ G˜ σ(t) > 0 and he will vote for A in the ﬁrst
round with probability 0 if ˜ G˜ σ(t) < 0. Moreover, ˜ G˜ σ(t1) > ˜ G˜ σ(t2). If ˜ σ is an
equilibrium strategy, then
˜ σ(B|t2) < 1 ⇒ ˜ σ(B|t1) = 0 and ˜ σ(B|t1) > 0 ⇒ ˜ σ(A|t2) = 0.
2
This lemma simpliﬁes the search for equilibrium strategies. In particular,
deﬁne
˜ h = ˜ σ(B|t2) + ˜ σ(B|t1).
By an abuse of notation, we denote by ˜ h any strategy ˜ σ that satisﬁes the
restrictions imposed by lemmas 4 and 6, with ˜ σ(B|t2) + ˜ σ(B|t1) = ˜ h. As
before, ˜ h = 1 denotes an equilibrium in which t1 voters vote for A and t2
voters vote for B in the ﬁrst round. We have
Theorem 2 If C is a serious contender, for large enough n there is at least
one equilibrium with 0 < ˜ h < 2. The value of ˜ h corresponding to any sequence
of equilibria converges to 1 as n goes to inﬁnity. 2
Remark This theorem implies in particular that in a large election there is
no equilibrium in which t1 and t2 voters “coordinate” in voting only for A or
only for B.
Proof From Lemmas 4 and 6, for large n, ˜ h = 0 is an equilibrium iﬀ
˜ G
˜ h(t2) ≥ 0, 0 < ˜ h < 1 is an equilibrium iﬀ ˜ G
˜ h(t2) = 0; ˜ h = 1 is an
equilibrium iﬀ ˜ G1(t2) ≤ 0 and ˜ G1(t1) ≥ 0; 1 < ˜ h < 2 is an equilibrium iﬀ
˜ G
˜ h(t1) = 0; and ˜ h = 2 is an equilibrium iﬀ ˜ G
˜ h(t1) ≤ 0.
If C is a serious contender, r3 > τ(A|ω)1/2τ(B|ω)1/2 for any strategy ˜ h.
Thus, we can use Lemma 5 for any such strategy. Now, consider any strategy
˜ h = 1 − , with 0 <  ≤ 1. Note that
−((r11(1 − ))
1/2 − (r12 + r11)
1/2)
2 > −((r11 + r12)




− 1 + 2((1 − )r11 + r3)
1/2((r12 + r11)
1/2
> −1 + 2(r11 + r12 + r3)
1/2((1 − )r12)
1/2.
18It follows from Lemma 5 that limn→∞ ˜ G
˜ h(t1), ˜ G
˜ h(t2) < 0 so that there cannot
be a sequence of equilibria converging to some ˜ h < 1. Now consider any
strategy ˜ h = 1 + , with 0 <  ≤ 1. By an argument similar to the one put
forward above, we have limn→∞ ˜ G
˜ h(t1), ˜ G
˜ h(t2) > 0. Thus, there cannot be
an equilibrium sequence converging to some ˜ h > 1.
The proof that there is in fact a sequence of equilibria converging to ˜ h = 1






= q(ω1|t) − uABq(ω2|t).
Recall that q(ω1|t1)−uABq(ω2|t1) > q(ω1|t2)−uABq(ω2|t2). Suppose ﬁrst that
q(ω1|t1)−uABq(ω2|t1) < 0. Then limn→∞ ˜ G1(t1), ˜ G1(t2) < 0. By the previous
argument, limn→∞ ˜ G1+(t1), ˜ G1+(t2) > 0 for every  ∈ (0,1]. Since ˜ G
˜ h(t1) is
continuous in ˜ h for every  for large enough n there exists some µ(n) ∈ (0,)
such that ˜ G1+µ(n)(t1) = 0. But then ˜ h = 1 + µ(n) is an equilibrium. Since
 can be chosen to be arbitrarily small, for large enough n we can ﬁnd an
equilibrium arbitrarily close from above to ˜ h = 1.
Similarly, if q(ω1|t2)−uABq(ω2|t2) > 0, there is an equilibrium arbitrarily
close from below to ˜ h = 1, and if
q(ω1|t2) − uABq(ω2|t2) < 0 < q(ω1|t1) − uABq(ω2|t1),
for large enough n, ˜ h = 1 is an equilibrium. For the other two subcases,
q(ω1|t1) − uABq(ω2|t1) = 0 and q(ω1|t2) − uABq(ω2|t2) = 0, see the proof of
Theorem 1. ￿
Recall that r11 > r12 and, if C is a serious contender, 1/2 > r3 > r12.
Thus, from Theorem 2, A is arbitrarily likely to win the election in the ﬁrst
round or to dispute a runoﬀ with C in state ω1, and B is arbitrarily likely to
win the election in the ﬁrst round or to dispute a runoﬀ with C in state ω2.
Thus
Corollary 2 If C is a serious contender, the equilibrium expected payoﬀ for
t1 and t2 voters converges to U(A,t1,ω1)q(ω1) + U(B,t1,ω2)q(ω2) as n goes
to inﬁnity. 2
195 Conclusion
This paper compares simple plurality voting and plurality runoﬀ from the
point of view of a group of voters with common preferences that is likely
to be the majority but which have divided opinions about which candidate
to support due to private information. A situation with three candidates is
modeled. The analysis gets complicated as it is conducted in a framework of
rational, strategic voters which are able to compare near zero probabilities.
The results of the analysis are clear, however. Simple plurality allows for
successful information aggregation among majority voters only if the candi-
date they like the least is not supported by a large minority. If the candidate
majority voters like the least is in fact supported by a large minority, plu-
rality runoﬀ gives majority voters a higher expected payoﬀ. The advantage
of plurality runoﬀ over simple plurality in terms of information aggregation
seems likely to hold in more complex situations (with more candidates and
more heterogeneity of preferences), even if completely successful information
aggregation of the sort obtained in this paper is not likely to hold. Ignoring
the possibility of coordination failures under plurality voting, the advantage
of the runoﬀ system consists in introducing an stage in the election game
in which voters can express their opinions without risking completely the
ﬁnal result of the election. The advantage of the runoﬀ system disappears
if primaries take place or if a sequence of preelection polls allow voters to
successfully pool their information about candidates.
20Appendix
Preliminaries We state here a result from Myerson (1998b) that will be
useful in the proofs that follow. Let λn(ω) = (λn(A|ω),λn(B|ω),λn(C|ω))
be any sequence of voting proﬁles. Deﬁne
Ψ(θ) = θ(1 − logθ).
































That is, the probability of a sequence of events is concentrated in the limit
in the voting proﬁles in that event with maximum probability.







AB(ω). If τ(C|ω) < (τ(A|ω)τ(B|ω))1/2 or, equivalently,
τ(C|ω) < (τ(A|ω)τ(B|ω)τ(C|ω))
1/3,
then, for large n,
P
X∈{A,B,C} τ(X|ω)Ψ(λn(X|ω)/(nτ(X|ω))) is maximized




























On the other hand, if
τ(C|ω) > (τ(A|ω)τ(B|ω)τ(C|ω))
1/3,
then, for large n,
P
X∈{A,B,C} τ(X|ω)Ψ(λn(X|ω)/(nτ(X|ω))) is maximized
on λn(ω) ∈ Ln(ω) by
λn(X|ω) = n(τ(A|ω)τ(B|ω)τ(C|ω))
1/3






= −1 + 3(τ(A|ω)τ(B|ω)τ(C|ω))
1/3.
We can proceed similarly with respect to the other sequences of events in
Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 4 It is argued in the text that a t3 voter will vote for
C for any strategy of the other voters. Thus, in equilibrium, ˜ σ(C|t3) = 1.
In what follows we show that under the conditions of the lemma a t1 or t2
voter obtains a larger payoﬀ by voting for A or B rather than for C if n
is large enough. Let p˜ σ
XY 0,p˜ σ
XY 00 denote, respectively, the probability that
voting for A in the ﬁrst round ultimately yields X but voting for C yields
Y , and the probability that voting for B in the ﬁrst round ultimately yields
X but voting for C yields Y , with X,Y = A,B,C. Then, the statement of
































































Since min{−(τ(A|ω1)1/2 − τ(B|ω1)1/2)2,−(τ(A|ω2)1/2 − τ(B|ω2)1/2)2} is less




12 )2, we have that uBCp˜ σ
BC0(ω2) > uABp˜ σ
AB0(ω2)
or p˜ σ
AC00(ω1) > p˜ σ
BA00(ω1) if









which is satisﬁed if C is a serious contender.
















(k,k + 1,m + 1)

,
corresponding to the ﬁrst term in p˜ σ
AB(ω). Recall that, by assumption of the















{(k,k + m,m),(k,k + m + 1,m)},
23corresponding to the second term in p˜ σ
AB(ω1). For λn(ω1) ∈ Nn(ω1) and large
n,
P










(ignoring integer constraints). Thus,
lim
n→∞(logPr(Nn(ω1)))/n = −1 + 2(τ(A|ω1) + τ(C|ω1))
1/2τ(B|ω1)
1/2.
The claim about state ω2 obtains similarly.
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